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LIABILITY OF A STATE FOR INTEREST
ON A JUDGMENT
The doctrine of sovereign immunity is firmly rooted in early
English Common Law,1 and although it has been reviewed, re-
ported and logically assailed in numerous articles,2 it clings tena-
ciously to modern jurisprudence.3 A state's liability on claims for
positive relief brought by citizens of the defendant state is limited
absent a mitigating statute.' One facet of any claim is interest;
the immunity doctrine, therefore, is directly relevant to the lia-
bility of a state for interest. This Comment will consider the lia-
bility of a state for interest by analyzing case law surrounding
and interpreting statutes which have been construed to be a waiver
of immunity but which make no provision for interest on judg-
ments obtained thereunder. The analysis here does not extend to
actions against municipalities.5 A number of states have enacted
1. 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW
(2nd ed. 1909):
The rule which in later times will be expressed by the phrase 'The
King Can Do No Wrong' causes no difficulty. That you can neither
sue nor prosecute the king is a simple matter of fact, which does
not require that we shall invest the king with any non-natural
attributes or make him other than the sinful man that he is. The
king can do no wrong; he can break the law; he is below the law
though he is below no man and below no court of law. It is quite
conceivable that he should be below a court of law. In the second
half of the [thirteenth] century some lawyers are already arguing
that this is or ought to be the case.
Id. at 515-16. The American counterpart to the English rule was elimi-
nated at an early date in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1872)
only to be vigorously revived in the form of the eleventh amendment to
the Constitution. See THE FEDERALIST No. 81; Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri
Bridge Comm'n., 359 U.S. 275 (1959); BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1568 (4th
ed. 1951).
2. See, e.g., Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1
(1924); Gellhorn and Laver, Federal Liability for Personal and Property
Damage, 29 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1325 (1954); Leflar and Kantrowitz, Tort Lia-
bility of the States, 29 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1363 (1954); Wade, Liability in Tort
of the Central Government of the United Kingdom, 29 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1416
(1954); Swartz, Public Tort Liability in France, 29 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1432
(1954); Note, Oregon's Governmental Tort Liability from a National Per-
spective, 48 ORE. L. REV. 95 (1969); Note, Handling Tort Claims Against the
State of Iowa, 17 DRAKE L. REV. 189 (1968).
3. E.g., Fosbre v. Washington, 456 P.2d 335 (Wash. 1969).
4. 81 C.J.S. States § 196 (1953); 49 AM. JUR. States, Territories and
Dependancies § 75 (1943).
5. 18E MCQUILLEN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53.24 (3d ed. 1963);
Annot. 24 A,L.R.2d 928 (1952),
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legislation waiving the immunity of municipalities but have re-
tained the principle of immunity to actions against the state.0
PRELIMINARY MATTERS-SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY GENERALLY
A search of the statutes and case law interpreting statutes of
the fifty states indicated:
1. Eleven states which have statutes which may be termed
Tort Claims Acts. 7 Some statutes of this type, however,
expressly allow contract actions as well.8 The form of the
action to be followed and the court in which the action
must be brought varies.
2. A number of states which have waived tort or contract
immunity against only a specified department or branch of
state government excluding municipalities.9 These states
have in common:
a. A reservation of the principle of sovereign immunity to
actions, tort or contract, against the state generally.
b. Waivers, commonly found in the enabling acts of the de-
partment or agency, in words similar to "[the agency is
hereby granted the power to] sue and be sued."10
3. Several states which have created a court of claims for the
6. E.g., ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 37, §§ 502-04 (1959); ARK. STAT. ANN.
tit. 17, §§ 701-22 (1968); GA. CODE ANN. tit. 69, § 308 (1967); LA. REV. STAT.
§§ 13:5101-5110 (1968).
7. ALASKA STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 950.250 (Supp. 1968); ARiz. REv. STAT.,
§ 12-821 (1956); HAWAII REV. STAT. tit. 36, § 662-1 (1968); ILL. STAT. ANN.
ch. 37, § 439,1 (1969); IOWA CODE ANN. ch. 613, § 613.8 (Supp. 1969); KEN-
TUCKY REv. STAT. ch. 44, § 44.070 (1959); MASS. GENV. LAWS ANN. ch. 12,
§ 3 (1966); N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 143, § 291 (Supp. 1967); N.Y. CT. OF
CLAIMS LAW § 8 (1963); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-11 (1968); WASH. REV.
CODE § 4.92.010 (Supp. 1967).
8. E.g., AmZ. REV. STAT. § 12-821 (1956); S.D. CODE tit. 33, § 0604
(Supp. 1960).
9. Jones v. Scofield Bros., 73 F. Supp. 395 (1947) (to determine what
branches by the state are liable for their torts or are liable on their con-
tracts one must look at the various enabling acts of the departments);
Georgia Highway Dept. v. Knox-River Constr. Co., 117 Ga. App. 453, 160
S.E.2d 641 (1968) (the doctrine of sovereign immunity is not applicable to
an action against the state highway department based on breach of its con-
tractual obligations); Alexander v. South Dakota, 74 S.D. 48, 48 N.W.2d 830
(1951); Stanley v. South Carolina State Highway Department, 249 S.C.
230, 153 S.E.2d 687 (1967); Allen v. Texas, 410 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. Civ. App.
1967).
. 10. The language allowing an agency of a state to sue and be sued has
raised some interesting problems with regard to the meaning and extent
of the waiver. See the discussion in text accompanying notes 28-41 infra.
trial of causes against the state.'1 These statutes are
commonly construed to not constitute a waiver of sovereign
immunity 12 and to only permit the legislature to allow or
deny claims on an ad hoc basis. The payment or denial
is ultimately dependent upon the action of the legislature;
the court of claims acts only in an advisory capacity. There
are, unfortunately, no statistics regarding the consist-
ency of the legislatures in following the recommendations
made by the courts.
4. A few states which provide for the payment of claims
through direct appropriation by the legislature. 3
5. A number of states which must be considered to be sub-
stantially immune from any action by a citizen for positive
relief. 4
There is also case authority that a state may be sued on its
contracts in the absence of waiver statutes when the state engages
in a proprietary function. 15
The majority of cases which deny recovery of interest do so on
the ground that "actions" against the state are prohibited in the
absence of statutes waiving immunity.16 The state's liability for
interest, therefore, centers on the unexpressed major premise that
the interest action is separate and distinct from the action for the
principal amount. It is submitted, however, that the interest action
is derivative by its very nature. Certainly, there can be no re-
covery for interest in the absence of a showing that funds on
which the interest is calculated were wrongfully retained, actually
or constructively, by the defendant. Since the legislature saw fit
to allow the primary action in a waiver statute, the derivative action
for interest should be allowed by the same enactment.
To facilitate the consideration of cases involving interest claims
11. E.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ch. 130, § 10-1 (1966); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ch. 53, § 4-141 (1966); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-1008 (1949); MissouRI STAT.
ANN. § 33.120 (1969); W. VA. STAT. § 14-2-1 (Supp. 1968).
12. Dinwiddie v. Siefkin, 299 Ill. App. 316, 20 N.E.2d 130 (1939) (held:
The state had not waived immunity in spite of the enactment of a Court of
Claims Act). But see Moore v. Illinois, 21 Ill. Ct. Claims 282 (1951).
13. D.C. CODE tit. 1, § 1-901 (1967); LA. REv. STAT. § 13:5108 (1968);
S.C. CoNsT. art. 17, § 2 (1860).
14. Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, Wyoming.
15. E.g., Spaur v. Greely, 150 Colo. 279, 372 P.2d 730 (1962); Grant
Constr. Co. v. Burns, 92 Idaho 408, 443 P.2d 730 (1962); Youngstown Mines
v. Prout, 266 Minn. 450, 124 N.W.2d 328 (1963); Mississippi Highway
Comm'n v. Wunderlich, 194 Miss. 119, 11 So. 2d 437 (1943); Meens v. Mon-
tana State Bd. of Educ., 127 Mont. 515, 267 P.2d 981 (1954); Stadler v.
Curtis Gas, Inc., 151 N.W.2d 915 (Neb. 1967); Northern Pac. Ry. v. Morton
County, 131 N.W.2d 557 (N.D. 1964); Rocell Constr. Co. v. New York, 208
Misc. 364, 141 N.Y.S.2d 463 (Ct. Cl. 1955); Jenkins v. Wisconsin, 13 Wis.
2d 503, 108 N.W.2d 924 (1961); 81 C.J.S. States § 120 (1954).
16. Fosbre v. Washington, 456 P.2d 335 (Wash. 1969).
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against the state, the decisions will be grouped according to the
type of action. It should be further noted that, especially in the
tort area, statutes waiving immunity are in some instances recent
developments, and, therefore, claims for interest have not occurred
with frequency, if at all.
TORT ACTIONS
The enactment of legislation which waives immunity but makes
no provision for interest has resulted in a division of case author-
ity on the question of the state's liability for interest.
In Reeves v. Louisiana' 7 plaintiff was awarded interest from
the date of judgment. Although the statute under which the ac-
tion was brought was silent on the subject of interest, the court
reasoned that the tort statute had been enacted following judicial
recognition in several cases of plaintiff's right to interest in contract
actions. It therefore considered the legislature to have authorized
the application of interest by its silence on the subject. The rele-
vant statute provided:
[S] uits authorized by the legislature against the state . . .
are to be governed by the same procedure required in
suits between private individuals and the effect of this
authorization is to be nothing more than a waiver of the
state's immunity from suit.18
The Reeves court, although it evidently felt the claim for in-
terest to be a separate action and thus subject to limitation by the
general rule of immunity, was willing to resort, in partial support
of its decision, to a weak argument to allow interest. Although
legislative silence is admittedly ambiguous, it is not often inter-
preted as a positive approval of a course of action. The result,
however, was further supported by a consideration of the lan-
guage of the statute quoted above. The court interpreted that
language in accordance with its plain meaning and, accordingly,
allowed interest against the state as it would be allowed against
any private litigant.
Similar language was considered by the Kentucky courts in
Kentucky v. Young1 9 where plaintiff claimed interest on an amount
found due it by reason of the state's negligence. The court, in
allowing the claim, considered the statute under which the action
was brought:
17. 232 La. 116, 94 So. 2d 1 (1957).
18. Id. at 117, 94 So. 2d at 2.
19. 380 S.W.2d 239 (Ky. 1964).
The court shall enter its findings on the order book as a
* judgment of the court, and such judgment shall have the
same effect and be enforceable as any other judgment of
the court in civil cases.
2 0
The court reasoned:
[T] he statute authorizing the procedure in this case pro-
vides in substance that the judgment of the circuit court
shall be enforceable against the Commonwealth as any
other judgment would be enforceable, which is equivalent
to saying that the attributes of any other judgment would
follow this one.21
Although the courts in Reeves and in Young construed statutes
according to the apparent plain meaning of words, most courts con-
strue similar statutes in the light of a rule of strict construction.2
As a result the plain meaning of words becomes irrelevant. In-
stead, the majority rule dictates the immunity of the sovereign
absent an explicit statutory waiver.2 Although no court has called
for it, the rule presumably requires the use of the word "interest"
in order for claimant to recover.2 4 The case of Fosbre v. Washing-
ton25 is representative of the strict majority view. The provisions
of the statute there construed were: "The State of Washington,
whether acting in its governmental or proprietary capacity shall
be liable for damages arising out of its tortious conduct to the same
extent as it if were a private person or corporation. '26 It is to be
noted that the statute in Fosbre is substantially similar to the
statutes construed in Reeves and in Young. The Fosbre court
found the state immune from an interest action. The rationale is
consistent with the view taken by the majority of states denying
recovery in the absence of express terminology. The dissent, on
the other hand, urged the adoption of the rule stated in Reeves
and Young although those cases were not cited.
27
A. "Sue and Be Sued" Statutes
Although Fosbre stands alone as a decision denying recovery of
interest under a statute like the provision there construed, other
courts, construing different statutory language, have reached
analogous results. It would appear that unqualified wording in an
enabling statute granting a department or agency the power to
20. Id. at 240.
21. Id. at 241.
22. Fosbre v. Washington, 456 P.2d 335 (Wash. 1969); cases and text
accompanying notes 28-41.
23. In Holton & Hunkel Greenhouse, Inc. v. New Hampshire, 274 Wis.
337, 80 N.W.2d 371 (1957), the statute provided for costs but did not pro-
vide for interest in explicit terms. The court accordingly denied the claim
for interest.
24. Id.
25. 456 P.2d 335 (Wash. 1969).
26. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.92.080 (Supp. 1967).
27. 456 P.2d 337 (Wash. 1969) (dissenting opinion).
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"sue and be sued" would allow actions in contract or tort. Yet, a
majority of courts have held that this wording constitutes a waiver
to contract actions only. Thus, decisions of this type construe
wording not to waive immunity in tort despite the apparent plain
meaning of the wording. In this respect these decisions lend sup-
port to the majority's rationale in the Fosbre decision.
In State ex tel. Fatzer v. Kansas Turnpike Authority2 the
state attempted to have the Authority's enabling act, which pro-
vided the Authority had the "sue and be sued" power, declared
unconstitutional as imposing or possibly imposing a liability
against the state in contravention of article XI, sections 6 and 7
of the Kansas constitution. The court noted:
ithout further discussion we think it may be said that if
contract liability is what is meant [by the state's argument
that the Act was unconstitutional] the question was laid
to rest in the last case cited [State ex rel. Boynton v. Kan-
sas State Highway Commission2g]. If tort liability is
meant, it must suffice to say that at no place in the Act is
there any waiver of the state's immunity.3 0
In the Highway Department decision the court noted that the
state's liability in contract actions was limited to the funds appro-
priated for the construction of the highway while in the Turnpike
Authority decision, the matter of tort liability was summarily
dismissed as quoted. The underlying rationale, although unstated,
must be that the state is immune in the absence of specific legis-
lation and the "sue and be sued" provision will not be construed
to amount to such specific waiver.
In a further example of the strict construction placed on the
language "sue and be sued," an Oklahoma court in State ex rel.
State Insurance Board v. District Court of Oklahoma County."'
noted:
Under that section [Oklahoma Statutes Annotated tit. 85,
§ 131 (1952)] the Fund may sue and be sued only in con-
nection with matters arising under the insurance con-
tracts which it makes. To subject the Fund to the pay-
ment of claims for torts of its officers or employees would
be to appropriate public monies to a private use. No
such appropriation can be made under our Constitution.32
No state has a constitution which denies interest explicitly. That
result stems from the court's interpretation of the constitution,
28. 176 Kan. 683, 273 P.2d 198 (1954).
29. 138 Kan. 913, 283 P.2d 770 (1934).
30. 176 Kan. at 691, 273 P.2d at 205.
31. 278 P.2d 841 (Okla. (1955).
32. Id. at 843.
and, as such, may be overturned by the court consistently with the
Constitution.
In the later case of State ex rel. State Insurance Fund v. Bone
the Oklahoma court overturned its earlier decision and did not
feel bound to follow its earlier decision by any constitutional pro-
hibition. The court stated:
[W] e now hold that the State Insurance Fund is a business
enterprise as distinguished from a purely governmental
activity and tort liability attaches and may be adjudicated
pursuant to the consent statute.
8 4
One of the few decisions which attempts to give a supporting
rationale for denying that the words "sue and be sued" constitutes
a waiver of immunity is Vigil v. Penitentiary of New Mexico. 5
There the court construed a "sue and be sued" provision to refer
to contract actions only. In support of that result the court cited
an earlier decision which stated:
The home [action against a state supported home] not hav-
ing been given the right to commit wrongs upon individuals
and it not having been contemplated that it would do so,
the right to sue the home for tort was never contem-
plated or conferred.26
This reasoning is dubious support for the denial of a just claim.
If defendant had been given the right to commit wrongs, the act
creating the home would have been struck down as unconstitu-
tional. To bar an action on the grounds that no wrongs were
anticipated is merely to restate, without justification, the propo-
sition that the words "sue and be sued" do not constitute a waiver
of tort immunity.
Messr's Irish and Protho 7 have suggested that the American
branch of the rule of sovereign immunity finds the reason for its
existence not in logical reasoning but in the impecunious financial
structure of the states at the time of the decision in Chisolm v.
Georgia.28 Thus, an attempt to discover an underlying rationale
for the immunity doctrine is born of futility. In what may at
least be partial recognition of the inequities of the doctrine of strict
construction as applied to the words "sue and be sued" the Supreme
Court of the United States rendered the decision of Petty v. The
Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commission. 9 There, plaintiff sought
recovery for the wrongful death of her husband by drowning on a
ferryboat owned and operated by the Commission. Both the fed-
eral district court and the circuit court of appeals found for de-
33. 344 P.2d 562 (Okla. 1959).
34. Id. at 569.
35. 52 N.M. 224, 195 P.2d 1014 (1948).
38. Id. at 226, 195 P.2d 1016.
37. Irish and Protho, The Politics of American Democracy 123 (1959).
38. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1792).
39. 359 U.S. 275 (1959).
Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
fendant on the grounds of sovereign immunity despite the wording
"sue and be sued" in the compact act creating the Commission.
There was, in addition, case authority in both states that the "sue
and be sued" wording amounts only to a waiver of immunity to
contract actions. The majority of the Court considered that the
Commission derived its authority from the United States Congress
through the compact act creating it. The Court, therefore, reasoned
that the "sue and be sued" language should be given a federal
interpretation and held the wording to constitute a waiver to con-
tract and tort actions. In effect, the sovereignty of the states was
abandoned when the party states agreed to enter the compact and
submit to federal authority. The dissent, written by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, argued that the state interpretations of the "sue and
be sued" language should be of paramount importance and should,
therefore, bar the tort action.
40
Thus, in the majority of cases, the words "sue and be sued,"
despite their plain meaning, result only in a liability in contract.
Courts adopting this view do so on the grounds that waivers of
immunity should be strictly construed.
41
B. Insurance Statutes
Since the majority of courts disallow tort actions despite the
"sue and be sued" wording, it follows in accordance with the strict
construction rule that they should disallow tort actions in in-
stances where statutes have been enacted allowing agencies of the
state to obtain liability insurance. Accordingly the majority of
courts which have considered such statutes and the actions taken
by officials under the statutes have found the statutes not to con-
stitute a waiver of immunity from suit.42 If there is statutory
authority to obtain insurance and yet case authority construing
that fact not to amount to a waiver of liability, both the legisla-
tive intent and the purpose of the added insurance costs becomes,
at best, mysterious.
Some statutes, on the other hand, provide that the insurance
contract constitutes a waiver of immunity.4 These statutes com-
monly limit the liability of the insured agency to the face amount
of the policy. Whether courts of this view would allow claimant's
40. 359 U.S. 283 (1959) (dissenting opinion).
41. E.g., Oklahoma ex rel. State Ins. Fund v. District Court, 278 P.2d
841 (Okla. 1955).
42. E.g., Pigg v. Brockman, 79 Idaho 233, 314 P.2d 609 (1957); Jones
v. Scofield Bros., 73 F. Supp. 395 (D.C. Md. 1947).
43. E.g., IND. STAT. ANN. § 39-1819 (1965).
action for interest on the judgment if the judgment exceeds the
coverage maximum probably depends upon whether the insurer
or the insured bears the added interest expense.
44
In light of the decisions which have construed "sue and be
sued" and insurance permission statutes not to mean what the
44. A large number of contemporary insurance contracts contain what
the industry and the courts have labeled "standard clauses." The standard
liability insurance policy provides that the insurer shall pay "all interest
accruing after entry of judgment until the company has paid or ten-
dered or deposited in court such part of such judgment as does not exceed
the limit of the company's liability thereon." 2 R. LONG, LAW OF LiABILITY
INSURANCE §§ 9.01-9.02 (1966); "Indemnity and liability insurance policies
now usually provide for the payment on behalf of the insured of "all
sums" which he shall become legally obligated to pay by reason of a risk
within the terms of the policy." 15 G. COUCH, INSURANCE 2d § 56:9
(1964); "Under most policies, the insurer is liable for interest on judg-
ments rendered against the insured, even though the amount renders the
total recovery in excess of the policy limits." 8 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE
LAW AND PRACTICE § 4899 (1962). See, e.g., Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v.
Indemnity Ins. Co., 260 F.2d 361 (10th Cir. 1958) (Insurer agreed to pay
"all sums" which the insured might become legally obligated to pay);
River Valley Cartage Co. v. Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co., 17 Ill. 2d 242, 161
N.E.2d 101 (1959) (Insurer agreed to pay "all interest accruing after entry
of judgment"); Underwood v. Buzby, 236 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1956) (Insurer
agreed to pay "all interest accruing after entry of judgment"); 2 R. LONG,
LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE §§ 9.01-9.02 (1966); 15 G. COUCH, INsURANcE
2d § 56.9 (1964); 8 J. AsPiL-zmAN, INSURAN CE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4899
(1962). The clause cited is most commonly used in contemporary con-
tracts. Ramsey, Interest On Judgments Under Liability Insurance Policies,
1957 INS. L.J. 407; accord, Pigg v. International Indemnity Co., 86 Cal. App.
671, 261 P. 486 (1927) where a variation on the standard clause was in-
cluded in the contract as follows:
[P1rovided, however, that the company's liability shall in no event
exceed [policy limit] for damages for such injuries to any one per-
son. And will in addition (1) defend (certain suits); (2) pay (cer-
tain expenses) - (b) pay all taxed costs; (c) pay all interest accru-
ing upon such part of such damages awarded by judgment as is
not in excess of the company's limit of indemnity as above de-
fined.
Id. at 675, 261 P. at 488; In Consolidated Underwriters v. Richards' Adm'r,
276 Ky. 275, 124 S.W.2d 54 (1939) another variation of the "standard clause"
was included in the contract:
In addition to these limits the Underwriters will also pay expense
incurred by them in connection with the investigation and adjust-
ment of claims under insuring clauses one and two; all costs taxed
against the subscriber in any legal proceeding while being de-
fended by the Underwriters on behalf of the subscriber... ; inter-
est accruing after entry of judgment upon such part thereof as
shall not be in excess of the Underwriters' liability as limited in
insuring clauses one and two....
Id. at 285, 124 S.W.2d at 59. In any of the three clauses cited it will be
noted that the insurer promises to pay to the injured third party, on be-
half of the insured, interest on the judgment. Notice, however, the cru-
cial distinction between the wording used in the first clause cited and
the two clauses immediately following. In the clauses cited last the in-
surer has carefully limited its liability to interest on the policy limits or the
judgment whichever is the smaller figure. In the clause set forth in the
text, on the other hand, the obligation of the insurer is expressed in terms
of "all" interest. Because there are situations where the judgment is
greater than the policy limits, the insurer's limitation of which figure
shall be used in the computation of interest is significant.
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statute apparently says or implies, the result in Fosbre v. Wash-
ington45 may be better understood. Although the decision may be
better comprehended, the reasoning behind it and other similar
decisions depends upon the rule of strict construction. The rule,
in turn, has little support in logic or policy. One decision, how-
ever, has indicated the purpose of the strict rule to be the pro-
tection of the state from burdensome interference with the per-
formance of governmental functions and the perservation of pub-
lic funds.46 That reasoning, however, is identical to the reasoning
propounded to support the rule of immunity and as such is subject
to attack for the reasons enumerated in the cases and articles
considering the rule of immunity.4 7 Additional support for the
strict construction rule might lie in the possible uncertainty among
lawyers and resultant litigation generated when a statute may be
said to have intended interest by implication. Supporting argu-
ments for the rule, however, are of little weight when contrasted
with the more weighty arguments of legislative intent, the plain
meaning of words, a concern for an equitable result, and the
derivative nature of the interest claim.
CONTRACT ACTIONS
Cases in this area should be read with a consideration of the
view, taken in some states, that a state waives immunity by enter-
ing a contract in the proprietary field.48 Contracts for purely gov-
ernmental purposes, on the other hand, are viewed by the majority
of states as made under and subject to the doctrine of sovereign
immunity.4 9
Practically all states have interest statutes which regulate the
rate, usually six per cent, of interest in the absence of any con-
trolling contractual rate.50 These statutory rates are not, of course,
considered to amount to a waiver of immunity under the majority
view since they are general in nature.5 1 In Georgia State Highway
Department v. Knox-River Construction Co. 52 the Georgia Supreme
45. 456 P.2d 335 (Wash. 1969).
46. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882); Glassman v. Glassman,
309 N.Y. 436, 131 N.E.2d 721 (1956).
47. See note 2 supra.
48. Rieth-Riley Constr. Co. v. Indian Village, 214 N.E.2d 208 (Ind.
App. 1966); Todd v. Board of Educ., 154 Neb. 606, 48 N.W.2d 706 (1951);
Jenkins v. Wisconsin, 108 N.W.2d 924 (Wis. 1961); 81 C.J.S. States § 120
(1954).
49. 81 C.J.S. States § 120 (1954).
50. See note 44 supra.
51. E.g., Boucher v. Doyal, 210 So. 2d 75 (La. 1968).
52. 117 Ga. App. 453, 160 S.E.2d 641 (1968).:
Court allowed claimant interest on liquidated damages determined
to have been wrongfully withheld by the state. The interest as-
pect of the decision turned upon the construction of the enabling
act creating the Highway Department." Since the act was held
to be a waiver of immunity to contract actions against the Depart-
ment, the court found the general interest statute controlling as
to the amount of interest.
4
In Otto B. Ashbach & Sons v. Minnesota"" a road contractor
sued for retained compensation and interest thereon for work per-
formed under a contract. The court cited the general rule disallow-
ing interest but then noted an exception where the statute might
have "reasonably" intended such a result. The statute there
construed provided:
[in suits arising out of contracts for the construction of
highways] the state hereby waives immunity from suit
in connection with such controversy and hereby confers
jurisdiction on the district courts of the state to hear and
try out such controversies in the manner provided for the
trial of causes in the district court.58
After citing cases from other jurisdictions allowing interest where
similar statutes were held to have "reasonably" intended the allow-
ance of interest, the court noted:
Such decisions are based on the theory that since the state
has consented to submit to civil litigation, it thereby has
placed itself in the same position as other litigants, and,
like them, rendered itself liable for interest on any debts
which the courts may determine are owing from it.6
7
The decision, however, rests upon the initial determination by the
court that the language of the statute did "reasonably intend" that
the state consented to suit as any other litigant. That determina-
ion is the key to interest liability; without it no liability ensues.
It was this first important step that the majority in Fosbre v.
Washington8 declined to take and, under a statute which might
be said to have imposed an even clearer interest liability on the
state, refused to find liability. Thus, a claimant seeking interest
has, despite the existence of a statute the plain meaning of which
causes the state to incur liability as an ordinary litigant, the bur-
den of persuading the court that the statutory language "reason-
ably intends" liability for interest as well as liability for the prin-
cipal sum. The Ashbach court felt the language of the statute
there construed to have "reasonably intended" interest liability.
That court reached its decision without discussing the "reasonable
53. GA. CODE ANN. § 95-1605 (1967).
54. GA. CODE ANN. § 110-304 (Supp. 1967).
55. 78 N.W.2d 446 (Minn. 1956).
56. Id. at 447.
57. Id. at 450.
58. 456 P.2d 335 (Wash. 1969).
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intention" of the statute. The majority in Fosbre, however, felt
that language even stronger than that in Ashbach did not in-
tend liability for interest.
The state may be liable for interest in the event that a con-
tract to which it is a party allows it.51 Thus, in L.A. Reynolds Co.
v. North Carolina Highway Commission6 where claimant sought
return of funds wrongfully withheld and interest thereon, the
court construed the contract provisions to amount to a waiver of
immunity to the claim for interest. The parties had agreed upon a
rate of 5% to be applied to any funds withheld more than ninety
days after the completion of the project. There was, therefore,
liability for interest in the amount specified.
Policy dictates that the state should be liable in all respects
as a private litigant where it enters a contract despite the majority
view denying liability except in proprietary contracts. If the pri-
vate contracting party could not sue for breach by the state, few
persons would be willing to enter contracts with the state. Thus,
most enabling acts of state agencies which have the power to
contract, provide that the agency may "sue and be sued." That
language, as noted above, has been interpreted to mean liability
only in contract."1
TAX CASES
Cases in this area have uniformly denied claimant's action for
interest and usually employ the rule of immunity in the absence
of express statutory language indicating the state's liability for
interest.
Where the appellant corporation prepaid a franchise tax and
subsequently sought a refund, the court noted that the statute un-
der which the claim was lodged did not explicitly allow for interest
on the prepaid funds.6 2 The court distinguished the case from an
action brought to recover taxes where a credit was allowed for
overpayment. Although the statute governing refund actions for
credits and overpayments explicitly allowed interest, the statute
concerning prepayments did not. It is submitted that there is little,
if any, difference of substance between an action to regain funds
where an overpayment or credit occurs and an action to regain
59. 81 C.J.S. States § 196 (1954).
60. 271 N.C. 40, 155 S.E.2d 473 (1967).
61. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
62. Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 73 Cal. Rptr. 896
(1969).
funds after a prepayment. Despite the existence of separate
statutory provisions for the prepayment action, a better result
would be to allow interest on prepayment as well as overpayment
or credited funds. The decision, however, may be supported
by considering that it is in accord with the strict constructionist
majority.
In Public Service Co. of New Hampshire v. New Hampshire63 a
claim for interest on taxes levied and paid under a statute later
held to be unconstitutional was denied. The court noted:
While the doctrine of sovereign immunity plays only a
peripheral part in this decision, it is material to the ex-
tent that it is recognized that the plaintiff can recover
interest only if the legislature has provided for it by stat-
ute, either expressly or by reasonable implication.
4
In Public Service the applicable statute provided "[the treasurer]
shall refund to the taxpayers the amount of any overpayment of
the tax not otherwise appropriated."6 5 Despite that wording the
court found no liability for interest on the state. A liberal inter-
pretation could have easily found the word "overpayment" to
have included interest since interest only represents that which
the taxpayer would have obtained had the funds remained in his
possession.
Appellant made a claim to support the action for interest un-
der a New Hampshire statute which allows the superior court to
"... make such orders or decisions concerning all matters ... as
justice may require."'6 6 The court, however, after analyzing the
legislative history of the refund statute under which the action for
the principal amount was brought, found that there had been a
deletion by the legislature of the section allowing taxpayer interest
on refunds. It therefore concluded that the legislature had specifi-
cally intended to deny interest and accordingly disallowed the
claim. The court further noted that if the applicable statute had
indicated that the court
should apply a liberal interpretation in favor of the tax-
payer and a strict construction against the state, a differ-
ent result would be expected. However, it has been settled
law in this jurisdiction for many years that the state is
not to be subjected to costs and interest unless the statute
provides for it expressly or by implication.
6 7
The substantive issue to be noted is the court's statement that inter-
est could be allowed "by implication" from a statute. Evidently, the
court felt that a stronger indication of implication is required
than the mere words "overpayment" when combined with the
63. 149 A.2d 874 (N.H. 1959).
64. Id. at 876.
65. Id. at 876.
66. N.H. REv. STAT. ch. .83, § 10 (1955).
67. 148 A.2d at 877.
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statute allowing the court to enter orders "as justice may re-
quire." As indicated above, a liberal interpretation of the word
"overpayment" could have included interest. In light of the
fact that the tax statute giving rise to the litigation was held un-
constitutional and the possible construction of the overpayment stat-
ue when combined with the equitable statute, it is submitted that
the court unnecessarily limited the right to interest by implication.
A New Jersey court felt restrained from awarding interest by
provisions in the New Jersey Constitution prohibiting the court
from ordering funds withdrawn from the state treasury in the
absence of legislative appropriations. 68 Reference to constitutional
limitations on the powers of a court in this area has been made in
other decisions.6 9 As stated above, no state constitution prohibits
interest in explicit terms, the usual provision refers only to actions
against the state. When an action for property wrongfully retained
by a state is authorized by a waiver statute, it is submitted that
the legislature intended claimant to have complete compensation.
The derivative action for interest, not being foreign to the action
for the principal, should also be permitted.
E ENT DOMAIN ACTIONS
Unlike the tax area, eminent domain decisions appear to uni-
formly allow claimant interest on the value of the condemned
property from the time of taking to the time of payment. The
distinction appears to be that the federal and state constitutional
provisions demand "just compensation" for the citizen and that
'just compensation" necessarily includes interest. Courts appear
to consider the eminent domain power vested in the state and in
some political subdivisions and departments to be the equivalent
of statutes waiving sovereign immunity.
• In Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Stupenti70 the court,
in awarding interest, noted that the words "just compensation"
means interest as demanded from the time of taking to the date of
payment. The court quoted from Smyth v. United States7l which
determined that the allowance of interest in eminent domain cases
had its origin in the federal constitution and constitutes an excep-
tion to the general rule.
68. East Orange v. Palmer, 52 N.J. 329, 245 A.2d 327 (1968).
69. See, e.g., State ex rel. Fatzer v. Kansas Tpk. Auth., 176 Kan. 683,
273 P.2d 198 (1954).
70. 257 S.W.2d 37 (Ark. 1953).
71. 302 U.S. 329 (1937).
In New Hampshire Water Resources Board v. Pera"2 the court
cited the general rule and also noted the exception in eminent
domain cases. Vermont courts have also rendered decisions com-
patible with Pera and Stupenti.
73
MISCELLANEOUS ACTIoNs AGAINST THE STATE
This category consists of relatively uncommon actions against
the state. Although a general rule may not be derived from the
few decisions in this area, it is probably safe to say that courts
are inclined to render liberal interpretations of statutes which
might be considered waivers of immunity where the state has
wrongfully exercised its police powers.
74
In Boucher v. Doya7 5 civil servants entered suit against the
state administrator of the division of unemployment security for
reinstatement and back wages with interest thereon. Claimants
alleged and proved their wrongful dismissal. The court, in denying
the claim for interest, noted:
It is now well settled that general laws relative to the pay-
ment of interest are not applicable to the state and its
agencies and that neither the state nor any of its agencies
may be cast for interest on an unpaid account in the ab-
sence of stipulation or express statutory authority for so
providing.
76
In Florida Livestock Board v. Gladden7  the owner of hogs
destroyed by the state sought recovery for their reasonable value
and interest thereon from the time of destruction. The court, in
holding claimant entitled to recover interest from the state, noted:
Where statutory authorization to sue a state or agency is
given, payment of interest on claims adjudicated under the
statute may be impliedly authorized when the nature of
the claim and the object designed in permitting such suits
against the state or its agency warrant such implication."'
It is to be noted that the statute made no provision for interest. 9
In allowing the claim the court considered the purpose of the legis-
lature in enacting the statute and considered, accordingly, "the
object designed in permitting such suits." In that manner the
Florida court went beyond the language of the statute and con-
sidered legislative intent. It is precisely this step that courts
72. 226 A.2d 774 (1967).
73. 124 Vt. 407, 205 A.2d 813 (1964).
74. E.g., Florida Livestock Board v. Gladden, 86 So. 2d 812 (Fla. 1956).
The statute only provided that the Board could sue and be sued but the
court found those words to mean liability for the wrongful destruction, a
result contrary to the general rule of strict construction. See cases and
text accompanying notes 28-41 supra.
75. 210 So. 2d 75 (La. 1968).
76. Id. at 84.
77. 86 So. 2d 812 (Fla. 1956).
78. Id. at 813.
79. FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 15022, § 341.25 (1931).
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applying the rule of strict construction decline to take. In so far as
the case may stand for that proposition, it represents a significant
expansion of the New Hampshire "reasonably intended" rule.
CONCLUSION
The question whether a state will be liable for interest on
judgments obtained against it is intimately associated with the
doctrine of sovereign immunity. Since it is well established, de-
spite logical and persistent criticism, that no action, with the ex-
ception of eminent domain actions, will lie against a state in the
absence of a statute waiving immunity, the secondary action for
interest has also been held to fail in the absence of explicit stat-
utory waivers. Courts taking this view represent the majority
and ground their decisions on the rule of strict construction. Thus,
despite wording which apparently places the state in a position
like that of an ordinary litigant, courts of this view have denied
claims for interest.
The minority of courts, on the other hand, will consider
whether the statute under which the claim was brought "reason-
ably" intended the allowance of interest. One Florida decision has
considered the purpose of the statute rather than limiting itself to
the wording. Although no other decision has expressly considered
legislative purpose when construing waiver statutes, it probably
constituted an element weighed by most courts of the minority
view. It is submitted that the minority, which considers the pur-
pose and reasonable effect of statutes, is the most equitable view.
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